Ernest Addo writes
As the mining lease of Gold Fields Ltd (GFL) runed Tarkwa Mine approaches a critical renewal point, critical questions are emerging as to whether Gold Fields should simply be allowed to continue operating, or Ghana should it seize the opportunity to place the strategic resource under greater Ghanaian ownership and control.
A far bigger question begs for answers – After 33 years of extraction, has Ghana received a fair enough share of the wealth generated from one of its most valuable mineral assets?
Reports-after-reports and expert views are challenging the continued external control of the Tarkwa mine, arguing that the expiration of the existing lease provides Ghana with an opportunity to rethink how its mineral wealth is owned, managed and converted into long-term national prosperity.
Key to the core of the argument is Gold Fields’ startling production record. According to figures cited from Gold Fields’ own reports in 2025, its Tarkwa and Damang operations produced more than 20.56 million ounces of gold between their respective acquisitions and 2025, with Tarkwa accounting for about 15.77 million ounces and Damang approximately 4.79 million ounces.
The document estimates that, using average annual gold prices over the respective periods, the two operations generated approximately US$25 billion in revenue, comprising about US$19 billion from Tarkwa and US$6 billion from Damang.
Yet the central issue, according to the document, is not simply how much gold has been extracted. It is who has ultimately captured the greatest share of the wealth created from Ghanaian soil.
Gold Fields acquired the Tarkwa mine in 1993 for a reported US$3 million, while the Ghanaian government’s direct shareholding in the operations has remained at 10 per cent, according to the document.
That ownership structure has become the foundation of the case for change. The document argues that while Ghana receives taxes, royalties and its share of dividends, the overwhelming ownership interest remains foreign, meaning a substantial portion of the ultimate financial returns accrues outside Ghana.
The argument becomes even more significant when Tarkwa’s performance within the Gold Fields global portfolio is considered. In 2025, Tarkwa reportedly produced 474,500 ounces and generated approximately US$1.6 billion in revenue, making it the group’s highest gold-producing operation that year.
In other words, the document suggests, Tarkwa is not merely another mine in the Gold Fields portfolio. It is one of the company’s most important economic engines -raising the stakes considerably over who should control it for the next 15 or 20 years.
The document also takes aim at the Development Agreement granted to Gold Fields. In 2016, the company reportedly argued that its Tarkwa and Damang operations would no longer be viable without special fiscal arrangements. Among the concessions sought were a reduction in corporate tax from 35 per cent to 32.5 per cent, import-duty and fuel-levy exemptions, and a sliding royalty regime.
In return, Gold Fields committed to substantial investments, including a reported US$6 billion investment at Tarkwa and US$1.4 billion at Damang, alongside employment and community-development commitments.
More so, the fiscal concessions deserve greater scrutiny. It puts the value of taxes, royalties, fuel and duty benefits granted under the Development Agreement between 2017 and 2025 at more than US$360 million, compared with about US$110 million in community development expenditure cited for Tarkwa and Damang.
That comparison raises a provocative question: did Ghana give away more in fiscal benefits than it received in direct community development?
The document contended that projects such as the Damang-Bogoso Junction Road should not necessarily be presented simply as acts of corporate benevolence, because the road was part of the commitments associated with the Development Agreement.
It further challenges the argument that Gold Fields’ payment of taxes and local procurement automatically makes foreign ownership preferable. Taxes, it says, are legal obligations that would apply to any operator, while local purchases are similarly necessary for mining operations regardless of whether the company is locally or foreign owned.
It identified dividends as the crucial difference, arguing that where ownership is predominantly foreign, dividends can leave Ghana, whereas locally owned mining operations could retain a larger share of profits within the domestic economy-potentially supporting investment, savings, businesses and employment.
Figures cited in the document indicate that the government’s 10 per cent dividend receipts between 2017 and 2025 amounted to approximately US$200 million, implying total dividends of around US$2 billion during that period and a much larger share accruing to the foreign majority shareholder.
The document’s wider contention is therefore that Ghana must stop measuring the benefits of mining merely by taxes paid or jobs created and instead ask a more fundamental question: where does the wealth go after the gold has been dug out of the ground?
Employment is another major fault line. The Development Agreement was reportedly linked to commitments involving more than 6,100 jobs, but the document alleges that Gold Fields subsequently went through repeated retrenchments at Tarkwa and Damang, creating continuing insecurity for workers.
It further alleges that the employment model shifted from permanent positions towards fixed-term arrangements and that labour-union influence was weakened. These are serious claims that would require responses from Gold Fields and the relevant labour authorities before they can be independently established.
The document also raises concerns about the treatment of individual employees, including an alleged 2023 case involving a senior manager whose employment was terminated while he was critically ill. It says the termination was later withdrawn following public outcry and makes further allegations about medical support. Gold Fields’ response to these claims is not contained in the supplied material.
Beyond labour issues, the document questions the presentation of capital expenditure as a special contribution to Ghana. Its argument is that expenditure on machinery, plant and waste stripping is fundamentally an operating requirement of mining and should therefore be distinguished from investment that directly builds the surrounding economy and communities.
It also points to what it describes as a mismatch between dividend payments and expansion in Ghana, arguing that profits generated locally have, in significant measure, been used to support investments elsewhere rather than producing comparable growth of the Ghanaian operations.
This brings the debate back to ownership. Now, Ghana has universities, engineers, geologists, managers and other professionals capable of running sophisticated mining operations. The document specifically points to institutions such as the University of Mines and Technology and KNUST as evidence of the country’s accumulated technical capacity.
It therefore rejects the assumption that Ghana must depend indefinitely on foreign companies to exploit its minerals. The document argues that domestic and international debt and equity financing could be mobilised to support Ghanaian ownership, while local control could keep more profits within the country.
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