A technical report submitted to the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has concluded that the macroeconomic benefits of the GoldBod programme significantly outweigh the trading losses reported by the Bank of Ghana (BoG), describing the initiative as a “high-return policy intervention” for Ghana’s economy.
The report, Evaluating the Macroeconomic Effects of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), was authored by Prof. Festus Ebo Turkson and Peter Junior Dotse of the University of Ghana’s Department of Economics, together with Prof. Agyapomaa Gyeke-Dako of the University of Ghana Business School. It is dated January 4, 2026.
According to the authors, GoldBod has played a critical role in reducing gold smuggling by formalising artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) exports. Recorded ASM gold exports rose from 63.6 tonnes in 2024 to 103.0 tonnes in 2025.
“The incremental 39.4 tonnes is plausibly gold previously lost to smuggling that has now been formalised,” the report noted, estimating that—on a conservative valuation—this resulted in approximately US$3.8 billion in additional foreign exchange entering the formal economy.
The economists compared these gains with the International Monetary Fund–reported BoG trading loss of US$214 million (about GH¢2.4 billion) and concluded that the benefits far exceed the costs. A direct comparison, the report stated, produces a benefit-to-cost ratio of roughly 18:1, adding that formalising just 2.2 tonnes of gold would have been sufficient to offset the reported loss.
Beyond smuggling reduction, the report highlighted the importance of non-debt foreign exchange inflows generated through GoldBod-supported ASM exports, which reached US$10.8 billion in 2025. The authors estimated that mobilising an equivalent amount through external borrowing would have attracted annual interest costs of between US$756 million and US$1.08 billion.
Even when assessed solely on reduced smuggling, the report estimates avoided annual interest costs of between US$266 million and US$380 million, describing these savings as recurring benefits rather than one-off gains.
The report further linked GoldBod’s operations to broader macroeconomic improvements, including international reserves of about US$11–12 billion, relative exchange rate stability, lower domestic costs of servicing external debt, a reduced import bill, and declining inflation driven by weaker exchange-rate pass-through.
Addressing public debate surrounding the BoG’s reported losses, the authors argued that the figures have been widely misunderstood. They explained that most of the losses arise from accounting translation effects rather than actual cash losses, noting that gold purchases are made at near-retail exchange rates to discourage smuggling, while foreign exchange inflows are recorded at the lower interbank rate.
As a result, the report estimates the true economic cost of the programme at about 2.5 per cent of the value of gold purchased—far below the headline loss figures.
In its conclusion, the report urged policymakers to assess GoldBod not as a commercial trading entity but as a macroeconomic stabilisation instrument. “GoldBod should be regarded not as a profit-driven trading entity, but as a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation and formalisation,” the authors said, describing it as a high-return policy intervention based on available evidence.
The report recommends sustaining price competitiveness to deter smuggling, improving transparency in BoG reporting, strengthening governance and oversight, and treating GoldBod’s policy-related costs as quasi-fiscal expenditures to be financed through the national budget.
